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I. Introduction 
Antiterrorism intelligence sharing across national borders has been 
trumpeted as one of the most promising forms of networked global gov-
ernance.
1
 By exchanging information across the world, government 
agencies can catch terrorists and other dangerous criminals. Yet this new 
form of global governance is also one of the most dangerous. Even at the 
domestic level, secrecy and national security imperatives have placed 
intelligence agencies largely beyond legal and democratic oversight.  But 
at the global level, accountability is missing entirely. Global cooperation 
among national intelligence agencies is extraordinarily opaque. The na-
ture of the international system compounds the problem: these actors do 
not operate within a robust institutional framework of liberal democracy 
and human rights. Safeguarding rights in the transnational realm when 
governments conspire to spy, detain, interrogate, and arrest is no easy 
matter.  
Privacy is one of the most critical liberal rights to come under pres-
sure from transnational intelligence gathering. This Article explores the 
many ways in which transnational intelligence networks intrude upon 
privacy and considers some of the possible forms of legal redress. Part II 
lays bare the different types of transnational intelligence networks that 
exist today. Part III begins the analysis of the privacy problem by exam-
ining the national level, where, over the past forty years, a legal 
framework has been developed to promote the right to privacy in domes-
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tic intelligence gathering. Part IV turns to the privacy problem transna-
tionally, when government agencies exchange intelligence across 
national borders. Part V invokes the cause célèbre of Maher Arar, a Ca-
nadian national, to illustrate the disastrous consequences of privacy 
breaches in this networked world of intelligence gathering. Acting upon 
inaccurate and misleading intelligence provided by the Canadian gov-
ernment, the United States wrongfully deported Arar to Syria, where he 
was tortured and held captive by the Syrian Military Intelligence Service 
for nearly one year.  
Part VI begins the constructive project of redesigning transnational 
networks to defend the right to privacy, with the safeguards of European 
intelligence and police networks serving as inspiration for transnational 
networks more broadly. These European systems feature two types of 
privacy safeguards: multilateral standards, to which all network parties 
must adhere, and unilateral standards, applicable under the law of one 
network party and enforced against the others through the refusal to 
share intelligence with sub-standard parties. Moving to the global realm, 
this Article concludes that the multilateral avenue is more promising 
than the unilateral one. Multilateral standards require consensus on 
common privacy norms, and consensus will be difficult to achieve. Not-
withstanding this hurdle, multilateral privacy standards are crucial, for 
they will both enable the cooperation necessary to fight serious transna-
tional crime and provide for vigorous protection of basic liberal rights.  
II. Types of Transnational Intelligence Networks 
Transnational networks are quickly becoming one of the most com-
mon forms of international cooperation, alongside classic international 
organizations and treaty regimes. In such networks, national officials 
representing distinct regulatory communities, such as environmental pro-
tection and financial markets, come together to address common cross-
border problems.2 They do so through a variety of formal and informal 
techniques: information exchange on best practices, promulgation of 
standardized regulation, and mutual assistance in enforcing that regula-
tion. As compared to more traditional forms of international cooperation, 
transnational networks are more flexible and informal and therefore can 
adapt more readily to changing circumstances.  
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, transnational networks 
have assumed an ever-growing importance in the national security arena. 
Intelligence-sharing networks draw on many different government enti-
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ties: foreign and domestic intelligence agencies, police, customs offi-
cials, immigration agencies, and financial regulators. Intelligence-
sharing networks also come in many different geographical constella-
tions. Some, like the intelligence-sharing agreement between the United 
States and Canada discussed in Part V, are bilateral; others are regional, 
such as the European Police Office (Europol); and still others, like the 
International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), are truly global.  
Despite such variation, these systems share two critical attributes: 
their purpose and the institutional means chosen to accomplish it. Each 
network deploys a decentralized, transnational government process to 
fight terrorism and other forms of serious crime. A national agency—one 
node in the network—gathers the information. Another national 
agency—a different node in the network—acts upon the information. 
Such government action can take a number of different forms: further 
information gathering through surveillance and other investigative tech-
niques, asset seizure, arrest, deportation, and prosecution. The network 
form of governance is quite obviously designed to match the fluid, bor-
derless nature of the problem at hand; terrorism, drug trafficking, and 
other forms of serious crime generally involve individuals and funds in 
multiple countries that can move quickly from one jurisdiction to an-
other. 
For purposes of understanding the rights implications of networked 
global governance, the most significant difference separating intelligence 
networks is the degree to which the network is centrally coordinated. At 
one extreme, the only coordination mechanism is an agreement among 
the different participants on the terms of cooperation. One example dis-
cussed in greater detail in Part V is the information-sharing arrangement 
established between Canadian and U.S. intelligence agencies in the days 
following the September 11 attacks. Under this purely verbal agreement, 
intelligence was to be exchanged in “real time” through direct communi-
cation among the various agencies involved.3 Another example is a 
recent European Union (EU) law on information sharing between law 
enforcement authorities in the member states.4 The law facilitates infor-
mation exchange by setting down a common procedure through which 
national police may request information from other national police, es-
tablishing a duty to cooperate with such requests, listing an exhaustive 
set of reasons for denying cooperation, and specifying response times for 
replying to information requests. Because only the national agencies in 
                                                                                                                      
 3. Comm’n of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to 
Maher Arar, I Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Factual Back-
ground, 31 (2006) [hereinafter Arar Commission: Factual Background I]. 
 4. Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA, 2006 O.J. (L 386) 89 (EC). 
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the network exercise public power, rights serve to protect exclusively 
against intrusive action by those national agencies.  
At the other extreme of the coordination spectrum, a central secre-
tariat is entrusted with significant responsibility for collecting 
information from network participants, analyzing that information, and 
then retransmitting the (improved) information to network participants. 
Europol is one such intelligence network.5 Located in The Hague, Euro-
pol is responsible for assisting the member states in combating a wide 
array of cross-border crime, including terrorism, counterfeiting, drug 
trafficking, smuggling of illegal immigrants, and motor vehicle crime.6 It 
manages three related criminal intelligence systems: the Europol Infor-
mation System, work analysis files, and an index system.  
The Europol Information System (EIS) is largely designed to facili-
tate information exchange among national authorities, who supply 
information on individuals suspected of having committed, or planning 
to commit, one of the covered crimes. National authorities then extract 
information from the system in the course of national investigations in-
volving a covered crime. The central office, however, also bears 
responsibilities for the EIS. It both manages EIS-related technology and 
solicits information from national police units to ensure that the system 
is complete.7 The central office is also a consumer of the EIS. It consults 
the system to conduct long-term strategic analyses on different types of 
crime, which are then circulated to national police forces.8 The central 
office can also use the system in connection with specific national inves-
tigations: one of its tasks is to assist with national criminal investigations 
by collecting and analyzing intelligence from the many different juris-
dictions potentially involved in the crime, some of which is extracted 
directly from the EIS.9 This criminal intelligence is stored in so-called 
work files and is also cross-referenced in an index system to permit eas-
ier access to the intelligence for purposes of related investigations.  
Clearly, Europol is not a federal police force10 but rather a network 
of national police forces. Nevertheless, it is a network in which the cen-
ter—the office in The Hague—is charged with significant 
                                                                                                                      
 5. Convention Based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the Estab-
lishment of a European Police Office, 1995 O.J. (C 316) 2 [hereinafter Europol Convention]. 
 6. See, e.g., Steven Peers, Europol: The final step in the creation of an “Investigative 
and Operational” European Police Force, Jan. 2007, at 2–3, http://www.statewatch.org/news/ 
2007/jan/europol-analysis.pdf. 
 7. Europol Convention, supra note 5, arts. 3.1(2), 8. 
 8. Id. art. 3.2. 
 9. See Summaries of the Union’s Legislation: Europol: European Police Office, 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l14005b.htm. 
 10. A number of proposed changes to Europol’s legal framework, however, might bring 
it closer to the federal model. See Peers, supra note 6, at 4–6. 
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responsibilities, all with the aim of improving the information available 
through the network. Because of these powers, rights must be guaranteed 
both centrally and nationally. 
Between these two extremes on the coordination spectrum lie net-
works with a central component performing only ministerial tasks for the 
participating states. In such networks, a free-standing government body 
can be charged with receiving information from and distributing infor-
mation to national actors, but without responsibility for conducting an 
independent analysis of the information. In this type of arrangement, the 
central body does not actively seek intelligence from the participating 
states, scrutinize that intelligence to guarantee its accuracy, or assess its 
relevance for crime-fighting purposes. Because the powers of the center 
are relatively insignificant, the need for an additional layer of rights to 
complement national guarantees is less pressing. 
The Schengen Information System exemplifies this intermediary form 
of network.11 A small group of European states signed the Schengen Con-
vention in 1985 to manage jointly the admission of foreign citizens to their 
territories. As part of the Convention, a common database was created to 
monitor foreigners admitted to the Schengen area with Schengen visas. 
Today, this database functions as an all-purpose, cross-border crime data-
base, containing information on, among other things, individuals 
suspected of having committed serious crimes, extradition warrants, car 
thefts, and passport theft or loss. The Schengen Information System is 
located and maintained in Strasbourg, but national police enter and ex-
tract information from the system entirely independently of the 
Strasbourg office. Unlike Europol’s office in The Hague, the Strasbourg 
office lacks control over the information contained in its database; nei-
ther does it have the power to assist national authorities with their 
investigations by soliciting and analyzing information held by other na-
tional authorities.  
III. Privacy in Domestic Intelligence Gathering  
One of the most fundamental rights at issue in intelligence-gathering 
activities is information privacy. The right to privacy limits the govern-
ment’s use of personal information, thereby protecting individuals 
against a wide array of abuses of government power. Perhaps the most 
obvious of these abuses, especially in intelligence operations, are depri-
                                                                                                                      
 11. Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 Between the 
Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their Common Borders, June 
19, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 68 (1991). 
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vations of life, liberty, and property based on inaccurate information. 
Because of the ease with which data can be gathered, stored, and com-
bined in the age of information technology, it is difficult to guarantee its 
accuracy. At the most basic level, data might be wrongly recorded 
through human error. When different data sets are combined, the infor-
mation in one of the data sets may be wrongly interpreted because its 
coding and software systems differ from the other data set’s systems. 
Moreover, the storage capacity of computer systems is so vast that in-
formation that has become obsolete, and therefore inaccurate, can be 
retained indefinitely.  
The questionable quality of such data is particularly troubling in the 
domains of national security and law enforcement, in which reliance on 
inaccurate data can lead to wrongful surveillance, detention, deportation, 
prosecution, and even conviction. Many consider the right to procedural 
due process to be the primary guarantee against wrongful government 
determinations. Yet many of the harms caused by the government’s use 
of bad information are kept secret. For instance, if such information 
gives rise to the belief that an individual is involved in a terrorist con-
spiracy, further surveillance will be conducted without alerting that 
individual. Other harms that result from inaccurate information are not 
legally recognized as constituting determinations against which indi-
viduals have recourse. Again, surveillance is a good example. Even if an 
individual is fully aware that she is being observed by the police, unless 
that observation rises to the level of harassment, she has no remedy. 
There is no procedure available to her for proving that the suspicions of 
the police are unfounded. By limiting the personal information that can 
be collected and by requiring accuracy when such information is col-
lected, the right to privacy operates as a critical ex ante guarantee against 
such government harms.  
Information about others can also be put to all sorts of illegitimate 
uses. An intelligence agency, of course, can legitimately use personal 
information to prevent terrorism. But if care is not taken, such informa-
tion can also be used to suppress speech and political protest, as 
occurred in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s. Discrimina-
tion based on religion, race, or ethnic origin is another illegitimate use of 
knowledge of others. Given that much of today’s terrorism originates in 
the Islamic world, both of these speech and discrimination concerns are 
implicated. Intelligence operations may target certain individuals based 
on their religion and country of origin rather than on actual facts con-
necting them to terrorist plots. Or critics of the U.S. presence in the 
Middle East might come under investigation, even though they neither 
explicitly encourage acts of violence nor serve as a cover for terrorist 
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groups. Distinguishing between legitimate suspicion and illegitimate 
discrimination and suppression of speech is often impossible, as terror-
ism can be associated with religious beliefs and critical speech. By 
limiting the information on ordinary individuals available to government 
investigators, privacy can defend against such abuses.  
Even more fundamental to privacy are the principles of human dig-
nity and individual autonomy.12 At the core of liberalism is the free, 
equal, rational person capable of choosing her own life projects. Critical 
to this liberal being is the power to keep certain matters private and to 
make other matters public. The duty of others, in a liberal society, is to 
respect the individual’s decision in favor of privacy. Yet when govern-
ment agencies collect, combine, and manipulate information on 
individuals without their consent, they breach that essential liberal duty. 
The government is guilty of the high-technology equivalent of gazing at 
citizens without their consent.  
Intelligence agencies, of course, routinely conduct intrusive, unre-
lenting surveillance. They are allowed this extraordinary privilege in 
liberal societies because such surveillance supports the critical mission 
of guaranteeing the survival of society in the face of threats to national 
security. When, however, surveillance is no longer used to protect na-
tional security and begins to serve more mundane public purposes, for 
instance preventing ordinary crimes like bank fraud, liberty is put at risk. 
To safeguard privacy interests, most countries have enacted informa-
tion privacy laws, known in Europe as data protection laws.13 Such laws 
specify the conditions under which the government may collect personal 
information. Generally, individuals must either consent to the collection 
and the intended uses of their information, or a piece of legislation must 
specify the public reasons for mandating personal data processing.14 
                                                                                                                      
 12. See, e.g., Stanley I. Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, in Nomos 
XII: Privacy 1 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971).  
 13. This discussion is based on U.S. and European legislation. In the United States, the 
relevant law is the Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 3, 88 Stat. 1897 (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000). The Council of Europe Convention on Personal Data 
Processing serves as the point of reference for national European laws, since the Convention 
has been ratified and implemented by most European countries.  
 14. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(e)(3) (2000) (setting forth information that must be disclosed 
upon collection); id. § 552(e)(4) (describing publication of notice of records system in the 
Federal Register); Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data art. 5a, Jan. 28, 1981, Europ. T.S. No. 108 [hereinafter Conven-
tion 108] (addressing fair and lawful processing of personal data); Bundesdatenschutzgesetz 
[Federal Data Protection Act], Dec. 20, 1990, BGBl. I at 2954, § 4(1) (F.R.G.) (“The collec-
tion, processing and use of personal data shall be admissible only if permitted or prescribed by 
this Act or any other legal provision or if the data subject has consented.”). To be entirely 
accurate, absent an authorizing law, European data protection laws require both disclosure of 
the purposes of data collection and consent to those purposes, whereas U.S. law requires only 
disclosure, not consent.  
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These laws restrict the amount and type of personal information that 
may be collected,15 and they limit the time during which personal infor-
mation may be retained.16 The personal information stored by 
government agencies must be accurate, reliable, and up-to-date.17 It may 
be put to uses different from those originally contemplated or shared 
with other government agencies only if doing so is necessary to fulfill 
the original purposes of the data collection or to satisfy imperative public 
needs.18 Further, individuals have a right to apply to government agencies 
to ensure that information stored in their government files is accurate 
and that, in every other way, it is being used in accordance with the law.19 
Enforcement of these privacy guarantees is generally entrusted to an in-
dependent privacy agency with the power to hear individual complaints, 
initiate investigations, and conduct other forms of oversight.20 The basic 
aim driving all of these laws is to ensure that as little personal informa-
tion as possible is floating about the halls of government, and that the 
personal information that absolutely must be stored in government com-
puters is reliable. If only limited amounts of reliable information are 
available, the theory goes, abuses of government power are less likely.  
Complementing these blanket information privacy laws are laws 
regulating specific types of government surveillance considered to be 
especially intrusive. In the United States and Europe, these forms of in-
trusive surveillance include searches of physical premises, wiretaps of 
electronic communications, and access to commercial data such as bank 
                                                                                                                      
 15. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1) (requiring that personal data be “relevant and necessary” 
to the agency’s purposes); id. § 552a(e)(7) (personal data “describing how any individual 
exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment” may not be collected routinely); Conven-
tion 108, supra note 14, art. 5c (personal data must be “adequate, relevant and not excessive in 
relation to the purposes for which they are stored”); id. art. 6 (identifying types of data consid-
ered to be sensitive). The types of personal data that may not be collected routinely are more 
limited in the United States than in Europe, where information on race, ethnic origin, health 
status, and other personal characteristics is protected.  
 16. See Convention 108, supra note 14, art. 5e. This is the one privacy guarantee for 
which no U.S. equivalent exists.  
 17. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5); Convention 108, supra note 14, art. 5d. 
 18. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (personal information may not be shared with other gov-
ernment agencies without the consent of the individual concerned); Convention 108, supra 
note 14, art. 5b (personal data is to be used only in accordance with the original purposes of 
the collection of such data).  
 19. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d); Convention 108, supra note 14, art. 8. Under the U.S. Pri-
vacy Act, however, individuals only have the right to demand that their information be 
corrected—not deleted.  
 20. See Colin J. Bennett & Charles D. Raab, The Governance of Privacy: Pol-
icy Instruments in Global Perspective 106, 108–09 (2003). This is the only major point 
of difference, in the legislative text, between the United States and Europe. In Europe, en-
forcement is entrusted to such independent agencies, while in the United States, individuals 
have the right to sue the government in court for privacy violations. 
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and calling records.21 Such surveillance is authorized for law enforce-
ment and intelligence purposes. But the preconditions for collecting 
personal information are particularly stringent: the government must 
demonstrate that the information (1) relates to an individual believed to 
have committed a crime—or in national security cases, an individual 
who is plotting to do so—and (2) that such information will help prove 
these claims. This showing must generally be made to an independent 
magistrate or to an executive official not directly involved in the investi-
gation. Once surveillance is authorized, the accuracy of personal 
information, and the individual’s right to challenge such information, is 
guaranteed mostly through the law of criminal procedure. 
The blanket information privacy laws described earlier generally ap-
ply to all government bodies, including police and intelligence agencies. 
Yet these agencies benefit from significant exemptions given the critical 
nature of their crime-fighting and national security missions and the im-
portance of personal information—and keeping personal information 
secret—to accomplishing their missions. Turning to surveillance-specific 
laws, different standards are created for different types of government 
activities. Tougher standards are imposed on the police than on intelli-
gence officers because of the different nature and impact of the two 
types of government action. Whereas the police investigate a concrete set 
of past events potentially leading to criminal convictions of the objects 
of surveillance, intelligence officers monitor an inchoate set of individu-
als and events that might, at some future date, pose a threat to national 
security. The primary purpose of such intelligence surveillance is dis-
rupting terrorist plots rather than bringing prosecutions. 
The extent to which law enforcement and intelligence agencies 
benefit from double standards, however, varies considerably from one 
country to another. The main differences between Europe and the United 
States concern the type of information that may be collected, the uses 
that may be made of such information, and the right of access to such 
information.  
                                                                                                                      
 21. On the U.S. side, the principal law on police surveillance is the Electronic Commu-
nications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522, 2701–2711, 3121–3127 (2000), and 
the principal law on intelligence-related surveillance is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1862. In Europe, regulation of the police and intelligence agencies is 
mostly national. To take the German example, the standards applicable to the police are con-
tained in the Code of Criminal Procedure while those applicable to Germany’s domestic and 
foreign intelligence agencies are contained in the G10 Law of 1968. Gesetz zur 
Beschraenkung des Brief-, Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses—Gesetz zu Artikel 10 des 
Grundgesetzes [Law Restricting the Secrecy of Correspondence of Letters, Mail and Tele-
communications—Law Applying to Article 10 of the Constitution], Aug. 13, 1968, BGBl. I at 
949 (F.R.G.). 
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The law in the United States stringently regulates the collection of 
certain types of information by both police and intelligence officers—for 
instance what is said in a telephone conversation. The use of such infor-
mation, however, is not comprehensively regulated, and indeed, since the 
September 11 attacks, police and intelligence agencies have come under 
heavy pressure to make wider use of information connected in any way 
to terrorism through information sharing.22 Neither is there an individual 
right to check such information for accuracy unless it is used as part of a 
criminal or other legal proceeding. Furthermore, in the United States, 
unless personal information is covered by one of the surveillance-
specific statutes, its collection and use goes almost entirely unregulated. 
That is because of the numerous exceptions for law enforcement and 
intelligence activities under the Privacy Act.23 True, most federal agen-
cies do have guidelines that impose general restrictions on intelligence 
gathering. These guidelines, however, are not enforceable in the courts 
and, as with privacy legislation, they focus on collection rather than sub-
sequent use and transfer of intelligence.24  
In Europe, by contrast, the government’s access to and use of per-
sonal information is regulated as a personal data processing continuum 
in which no stage is considered more or less harmful than the next.25 Pri-
vacy rights apply throughout. Moreover, privacy principles cover all 
personal information, as opposed to only certain types of especially pri-
vate information gathered with particularly intrusive means. This broader 
coverage is a product of constitutional law and blanket data protection 
laws. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the European Convention on Human 
Rights and national constitutions have been interpreted to confer a right 
to information privacy.26 All government agencies and all types of per-
                                                                                                                      
 22. Compare 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802–1811 (requirements for intelligence-related wiretap-
ping), with 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (restrictions on use of information acquired through 
intelligence-related surveillance). The main impetus for information-sharing between mem-
bers of a broadly defined “intelligence community” came from the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 109-279, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004). 
 23. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)–(k) (2007). 
 24. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal Policy, Attorney General’s 
Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence 
Collection (2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/nsiguidelines.pdf [hereinafter 
2003 FBI Guidelines]. 
 25. See, e.g., Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [Federal Data Protection Act], Dec. 20, 1990, 
BGBl. I at 2954, § 1 (F.R.G.). 
 26. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No. 005. See, e.g., Rotaru v. 
Romania, 2000-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 156 (holding that storage and use of personal information in a 
police file, together with the refusal of the right of correction, amounts to interference with 
private life under Article 8); Leander v. Sweden, 116 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 124 (1987) 
(holding that recording personal details in police files constitutes interference with private life 
under Article 8); Malone v. United Kingdom, 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 289 (1984) (holding 
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sonal information, therefore, are subject to constitutional privacy norms. 
And compared to the U.S. Privacy Act, the exceptions for law enforce-
ment and intelligence activities in European data protection laws are 
more limited.27 
IV. Privacy in Transnational Intelligence Networks 
Intelligence sharing across national borders replicates and magnifies 
the privacy dangers of personal data processing performed by a single 
national government. In the transnational context, the danger of depriva-
tions of life, liberty, or property based on inaccurate information is 
particularly acute. Personal information, in another government’s data-
base and organized using a different coding system, is susceptible to 
misinterpretation. This is a danger that has long been recognized in 
transferring data sets between agencies within a single government. The 
so-called practice of data matching—comparing information on an indi-
vidual in one database with information on that same individual in 
another database—has led to many episodes of grave injustice in the 
domestic realm. One common example can be found in the area of wel-
fare policing. In many instances, individuals have been struck off welfare 
rolls because their income data, collected for purposes different from 
those of distributing welfare entitlements, wrongly suggested that they 
were no longer eligible for public assistance.28 
When such personal information moves not simply from one gov-
ernment agency to another, but from a government agency in one 
country to a government agency in another country, the danger of gov-
ernment decisions based on inaccurate information is magnified. These 
agencies are even less likely than agencies at the national level to share 
the same infrastructure and information technology protocols. And to 
repeat, in the intelligence domain, the possible wrongful government 
action is particularly grievous: surveillance, interrogation, detention, de-
portation, prosecution, or even conviction. Transnational intelligence 
exchange also triggers the privacy concerns identified earlier. The more 
                                                                                                                      
that open registers constitute an interference with private life under Article 8). For the German 
case, see Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal 
Republic of Germany 323, 324–25 (2d ed. 1997) (Census Act Case), and for the French 
case, see CC decision no. 94-352, Jan. 18, 1995, Recs. 2–4 (Loi d’orientation et de program-
mation relative à la sécurité) and CC decision no. 2004-499DC, July 29, 2004, Rec. 2 (Loi 
relative à la protection des personnes physiques à l’égard des traitements de données à carac-
tère personnel). 
 27. See, e.g., BGBl. I at 2954, § 19(3); 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)–(k). 
 28. See Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 707, 718 (1987). 
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widely available personal information is, the greater the danger that gov-
ernments will harass individuals illegitimately based on their political 
views, religious beliefs, ethnicity, and so on. The opportunities for op-
pressive, liberty-destroying government surveillance are also multiplied.  
If each national party to a transnational intelligence network adhered 
to the privacy guarantees discussed earlier, the dangers of transnational 
information exchange would be manageable. Each national node of the 
transnational network would guarantee the reliability of personal infor-
mation and would restrict sharing with other national agencies, thereby 
reducing the prospect of wrongful uses of personal information.  
In the chaotic international realm, however, not all countries adhere 
to privacy norms and other basic liberties. The right to privacy, therefore, 
is at the mercy of each and every intelligence agency in the network. 
Personal information can be collected by one national agency, used by a 
second for conducting surveillance, and transferred to yet a third for 
purposes of freezing financial assets or bringing a criminal prosecution. 
If only one of these many actors violates the right to privacy, individuals 
are at risk of all the harms identified earlier. All the other participating 
agencies, though entirely rights-abiding at home, become complicit in 
this privacy violation: they either supplied the personal information that 
produced the rights breach or they acted upon bad information, thus 
compounding the rights breach. 
V. The Case of Maher Arar 
The recent case of Maher Arar offers a rare insight into what can go 
wrong in the secretive world of networked intelligence when the partici-
pating government agencies fail to respect privacy. Maher Arar is a 
Canadian citizen of Syrian origin who has resided in Canada since he 
was a teenager.29 Although he was under surveillance in connection with 
a Canadian terrorist investigation, there was, and continues to be, no evi-
dence suggesting he constituted a national security threat.30 On 
September 26, 2002, he was traveling back to Montreal from Tunisia, a 
route that took him through John F. Kennedy International Airport in 
New York. At the airport, U.S. authorities detained him based on infor-
mation provided by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.31 The Canadian 
                                                                                                                      
 29. Comm’n of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to 
Maher Arar, Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recom-
mendations 27 (2006) [hereinafter Arar Commission: Analysis and Recommendations].  
 30. Id. at 9.  
 31. Id. at 30. Since the United States refused to participate in the Canadian inquiry, the 
Commission was unable to reach a definitive conclusion on this point. The report states, how-
ever, that “[i]t is very likely that, in making the decisions to detain and remove Mr. Arar to 
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government subsequently found this information to be inaccurate. A 
week later, on October 7, 2002, U.S. authorities deported Arar to Syria 
without any warning to the Canadian government. (Arar is also a Syrian 
citizen.) According to the deportation order of the Regional Director of 
the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the evidence “clearly 
and unequivocally reflects that Mr. Arar is a member of a foreign terror-
ist organization, to wit Al Qaeda.”32 Once in Syria, Arar was transferred 
to Syrian Military Intelligence, in whose custody he remained for almost 
one year. Only on October 5, 2003 was Arar released to the Canadian 
consul in Damascus.33 During the first weeks of Arar’s detention he was 
tortured.34 Subsequently, according to the report of the Canadian Com-
mission of Inquiry appointed to investigate the events,  
[w]hile the physical beatings had ended . . . the conditions of his 
imprisonment in the Palestine Branch [of Syrian Military Intelli-
gence] . . . had been abysmal. He had been confined in a tiny 
cell with no natural light. He had slept on the floor and endured 
disgusting sanitary conditions. Mr. Arar had suffered enor-
mously. He continues to experience the after-effects to this day.35 
This set of events was the product of a transnational intelligence 
network. There is a long history of collaboration between the Royal Ca-
nadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and U.S. intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies. In the days following the September 11 attacks, 
however, Canadian and U.S. officials met and verbally agreed to improve 
such cooperation with what was known as a “free-flow-of-information 
agreement.”36 The agreement abandoned the numerous official protocols 
that had retarded or impeded information sharing in the past. Soon af-
terwards, Arar came to the attention of the RCMP when he was observed 
meeting with Abdullah Almalki, the target of a terrorist investigation. 
The meeting prompted an investigation of Arar during which Canadian 
officials shared information with U.S. authorities pursuant to the earlier 
free-flow-of-information agreement. As extensively documented by the 
Commission of Inquiry, much of the information on Arar turned out to 
be inaccurate and misleading. It was this very information that led the 
                                                                                                                      
Syria, the U.S. authorities relied on information about Mr. Arar provided by the RCMP. Al-
though I cannot be certain without the evidence of the American authorities, the evidence 
strongly supports this conclusion.” Id.  
 32. Jules Lobel, Op-Ed, The Arar Report: The US Should Follow Canada’s Lead, Ju-
rist, Sept. 26, 2006, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/09/arar-report-us-should-follow-
canadas.php. 
 33. Arar Commission: Analysis and Recommendations, supra note 29, at 45.  
 34. Id. at 32. 
 35. Id. at 45.  
 36. Arar Commission: Factual Background I, supra note 3, at 38. 
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U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service to conclude that Arar was a 
member of al Qaeda and to wrongfully deport him to Syria.  
Although a complete chronicle of these missteps is beyond the scope 
of the current discussion, some specific examples will illustrate the risks 
inherent in intelligence sharing. In late October 2001, the RCMP re-
quested both a Canadian and a U.S. border lookout for Arar. In both 
requests, the RCMP indicated that Arar was part of a “group of Islamic 
Extremist individuals suspected of being linked to the Al Qaeda terrorist 
movement,”37 a claim supported only by the observation that Arar and 
Almalki had met at a café and had walked together in the rain for twenty 
minutes. Although the Commission of Inquiry agreed that the request for 
a border lookout was reasonable, it deemed the identification of Arar 
with al Qaeda “inaccurate and potentially inflammatory.” Later, as 
chronicled by the Commission of Inquiry,  
Project A-O Canada [the RCMP division responsible for the 
Arar investigation] provided documents to the American agen-
cies that variously described Mr. Arar as a suspect, a target, a 
principal subject of its investigation, a person with an “impor-
tant” connection to Mr. Almalki, a person directly linked to Mr. 
Almalki in a diagram titled “Bin Laden’s Associates: Al Qaeda 
Organization in Ottawa,” and a business associate or a close as-
sociate of Mr. Almalki. 
These descriptions were either completely inaccurate or, at a 
minimum, tended to overstate Mr. Arar’s importance in the Pro-
ject A-O Canada investigation. I repeat that Project A-O 
Canada’s view was that Mr. Arar was never a suspect—he was 
merely a person of interest. While it might be that, in meetings, 
the Project’s officers communicated this actual view of Mr. 
Arar’s status in the investigation, there was no justification for 
the improper and unfair labels attached to him in written docu-
ments.38 
In the hands of the U.S. authorities, these inaccurate and unfair labels 
had consequences that were entirely unforeseen by the Canadian officers 
at the time the intelligence was originally gathered.  
On the Canadian side, much of the blame for this disastrous chain of 
events rests with the post-September 11 free-flow-of-information agree-
ment. In that agreement, the RCMP abandoned the privacy policies that 
ordinarily would have governed national security investigations. These 
                                                                                                                      
 37. Arar Commission: Analysis and Recommendations, supra note 29, at 20–21.  
 38. Id. at 25. 
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official policies seek to assure the reliability of personal information and 
to restrict the sharing of such information—aims that should be familiar 
from the earlier discussion of privacy harms and legal remedies. In the-
ory, whenever the RCMP gathers information in national security 
investigations, it must be assessed and rated for reliability on a scale of 
“reliable,” “believed reliable,” “unknown reliability,” or “doubtful reli-
ability.”39 When sharing such information with other agencies, the 
reliability rating must be attached. In addition, classified information—
which includes practically all the information gathered in a national se-
curity investigation—may be shared with other agencies only on a 
“need-to-know basis.” In other words, the officers involved must be sat-
isfied that such information will assist with an ongoing investigation 
before releasing it. If a decision is made to share classified information 
with other agencies, domestic or foreign, the information must contain a 
written “caveat.” That caveat prohibits the receiving agency from sharing 
the information without the consent of the RCMP and, in those instances 
in which the information is transferred to a foreign agency, limits the use 
of the information to the “intelligence community” of the foreign coun-
try.40 
Because of the post-September 11 decision to dispense with standard 
privacy protocols, there were none of the red flags that ordinarily would 
have signaled the highly dubious connection between Arar and extremist 
terrorism. The Canadians failed to indicate the low reliability of the in-
telligence on Arar. They further failed to communicate that the 
information was to be used only by the U.S. intelligence community, not 
by a U.S. immigration agency with the power to detain and deport indi-
viduals.  
The blame naturally does not rest entirely with the Canadian node of 
the transnational intelligence network. On the U.S. side too, privacy law 
failed. As explained earlier, when an intelligence agency uses personal 
information like Arar’s, it is entirely free of the legal requirements im-
posed by the U.S. Privacy Act. Like the Canadian RCMP, U.S. intelligence 
agencies are governed by internal privacy policies. The officers from the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) responsible for Arar’s case would 
have been covered by the Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Foreign 
Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigation (the 
Guidelines), replaced in 2003 by a modified set of guidelines.41 Of course, 
the Guidelines might have been suspended or modified following the 
September 11 attacks. But even if the Guidelines had been fully opera-
                                                                                                                      
 39. Id. at 324. 
 40. Arar Commission: Factual Background I, supra note 3, at 31. 
 41. See generally 2003 FBI Guidelines, supra note 24. 
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tive, it does not appear that the information privacy lapses would have 
been caught. Both the pre- and post-2003 versions of the Guidelines fo-
cus largely on limiting the circumstances under which information may 
be collected. What happens to that information after collection receives 
little attention. Thus, the Guidelines impose no duty to ensure informa-
tion reliability or to code such information based on different levels of 
reliability, as required by the Canadian system.42  
The Guidelines do regulate the sharing of personal information with 
other federal and state agencies, albeit less so today than under the pre-
2003 version. But even the more robust sharing restrictions contained in 
the pre-2003 Guidelines would not have applied to Arar: only U.S. citi-
zens and permanent residents of the United States are covered and 
therefore, even under the pre-2003 Guidelines, information on Arar 
could have been used “for any lawful purpose.”43 The intelligence offi-
cers responsible for Arar’s deportation, therefore, were under no duty to 
verify independently that the Canadian intelligence was reliable. Nor 
were they required to refrain from communicating sketchy intelligence 
to powerful law enforcement and immigration agencies.44  
Of course, privacy was not the only right the U.S. node of the 
transnational intelligence network violated.45 Rather than bring a 
                                                                                                                      
 42. Recently, however, the reliability requirement has been adopted as part of another 
set of guidelines applicable to the entire intelligence community, including the FBI. See Pro-
gram Manager, Info. Sharing Env’t, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, 
Guidelines to Ensure that the Information Privacy and Other Legal Rights of 
Americans are Protected in the Development and Use of the Information Sharing 
Environment 5 (2006), available at http://www.ise.gov/docs/ise%20privacy%20guidelines% 
2012-4-06.pdf. 
 43. Attorney Gen., Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and 
Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations 25 (1995), available at http://www.fas.org/ 
irp/agency/doj/fbi/terrorismintel2.pdf. 
 44. Indeed, since September 11, intelligence officers are under the reverse duty: they 
must freely share terrorism-related intelligence with all members of the intelligence commu-
nity. The intelligence community is comprised of intelligence, law enforcement, and 
immigration agencies at the federal, state, and local levels. See Intelligence Reform and Ter-
rorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004). 
 45. Interpol provides an illustration of these same privacy harms in the context of a 
multilateral, as opposed to bilateral, network. See About Interpol, http://www.interpol.int/ 
public/icpo/default.asp. Interpol is an international police organization charged with, among 
other things, managing a system of international notices for its 186 member states. This sys-
tem enables member countries to issue notices requesting the arrest of wanted individuals, 
information on criminal suspects, the identification of missing persons, and other types of 
action in the organization’s other member countries. Interpol is responsible for communicating 
these notices to national police, and although national police are not legally bound to comply, 
they very often do take the requested action.  
In a number of cases, member governments have abused the system by posting arrest no-
tices for individuals wanted not for their criminal acts but for their political views, causing 
these individuals to be detained wrongfully by the police in other countries. See generally 
Charles R. Both, International Police Force or Tool for Harassment of Human Rights Defend-
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criminal prosecution or deport Arar to Canada, U.S. authorities deported 
Arar to Syria; they delivered him into the custody of the Syrian Military 
Intelligence Service, where the likelihood of human rights abuses was 
high, to say the least. Although this example of the post-September 11 
practice of extraordinary renditions falls outside the scope of this Article, 
it bears mentioning. It underscores the consequences of bad Canadian 
intelligence in the hands of another country’s intelligence agency that 
failed to respect not simply privacy but human rights more generally.  
The Canadian Commission of Inquiry aptly dubbed these liberty 
dangers the “ripple effect” of transnational information sharing. It is 
worthwhile repeating in full the lessons drawn by the Commission from 
Mr. Arar’s case: 
sharing information from investigations in Canada with other 
countries can have a “ripple effect” beyond Canada’s borders, 
with consequences that may not be controllable from within 
Canada. The legal power of Canadian courts and governments to 
require respect of constitutional rights and freedoms is exercised 
within Canada’s territorial borders. Once a person or informa-
tion moves outside of Canada, it becomes difficult to ensure 
treatment of that person or information in accordance with Ca-
nadian constitutional rights and values . . . . 
Canadian investigators may receive and act upon information 
from other countries. Use of this information may have signifi-
cant personal consequences for individuals in Canada and their 
associates such as investigation, surveillance, arrest or prosecu-
tion. In some instances, such information may have been 
acquired in ways inconsistent with rights and freedoms protected 
here. For example, it may have been obtained through torture or 
other unacceptable investigation techniques, or in the absence of 
checks and balances to ensure reliability.46 
The Commission therefore recommended establishing an independ-
ent review body with the power to conduct privacy and civil liberties 
investigations and to hear individual complaints. This review body would 
                                                                                                                      
ers and Political Adversaries: Interpol’s Rift with the Human Rights Community, 8 ILSA J. 
Int’l & Comp. L. 357 (2002). In other words, law enforcement agencies that use information 
on their citizens to harass them at home have taken advantage of the Interpol network to har-
ass them abroad. Similarly, member countries might legitimately request additional 
information on criminal suspects through the notice system, but the identification of suspects 
might lead receiving member countries not only to, say, search their criminal databases for 
entries under the suspect’s name, but also to engage in illegitimate, illiberal harassment of 
those suspects. 
 46. Arar Commission: Analysis and Recommendations, supra note 29, at 431. 
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have jurisdiction only over the RCMP’s national security activities. 
Oversight of other intelligence agencies would be left to other govern-
ment watchdogs.47 One important task of the review body would be to 
guarantee that the RCMP’s privacy protocols were strictly followed in 
exchanging information with domestic and foreign agencies,48 and that 
special policies were developed—and followed—when sending or re-
ceiving information from countries with poor human rights records.49  
VI. Redesigning Transnational Intelligence 
Networks to Protect Privacy 
Europe contains useful insights for protecting innocent individuals 
like Maher Arar caught in the web of transnational intelligence gather-
ing. The European experience with government by network, including 
intelligence networks, is the longest and richest of any region in the 
world.50 That is because European integration has proceeded not through 
the transfer of national sovereignty to a federal center, but through the 
sharing and pooling of sovereignty in the network form of governance. 
With this experience comes a host of institutional and legal mechanisms 
for promoting rights and democratic accountability in transnational net-
works.  
Although these mechanisms have not always succeeded, European 
legislators have had ample opportunity to experiment with institutional 
design, particularly with regard to safeguarding the right to information 
privacy. In contrast with the United States, where information privacy is 
recognized only as a statutory, not a constitutional right, in Europe in-
formation privacy is considered a fundamental right no less vital than 
more traditional rights such as freedom of expression and the right to 
property.51 Therefore, when establishing transnational networks, Euro-
pean legislators are under a constitutional duty to protect the right to 
information privacy. 
                                                                                                                      
 47. Id. at 503. 
 48. Id. at 521. 
 49. Id. at 522. 
 50. Cf. Francesca Bignami, Transgovernmental Networks vs. Democracy: The Case of 
the European Information Privacy Network, 26 Mich. J. Int’l. L. 807, 813–19 (2005). 
 51. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra 
note 26, art. 8. See, e.g., Rotaru v. Romania, 2000-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 156 (2000) (holding that 
storage and use of personal information in a police file, together with refusal of right of cor-
rection, amounts to interference with private life under Article 8); Leander v. Sweden, 116 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 124 (1987) (holding that recordation in a secret register coupled with 
a refusal to allow review and refutation constitutes interference with private life under Article 
8); Malone v. United Kingdom, 82 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 289 (1984) (holding that open 
registers constitute an interference with private life under Article 8). 
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There are a number of intelligence networks in Europe. Three 
prominent examples were mentioned earlier: Europol, Schengen, and an 
EU law on information exchange among national police forces. Of these, 
Europol offers the best illustration of the different possibilities for safe-
guarding privacy in transnational networks whose reach extends beyond 
Europe. Because Europol is a self-contained system, privacy rights are 
built directly into it rather than scattered throughout the different laws, 
regulations, and judicial decisions of the European Union. Furthermore, 
as a form of network that relies both on the nodes and the center to pro-
vide intelligence, privacy must be protected in the work of both actors—
the participating national agencies and the central office. As a result, the 
privacy architecture of Europol is the most comprehensive of all three 
networks.  
Under the Europol Convention, both national police authorities and 
the central office are held to data protection standards. The Convention 
requires each national participant to adopt the standards of the Council 
of Europe Convention on Personal Data Processing into its domestic 
law.52 Without implementation, a state cannot enter information into or 
extract information from the Europol system. In other words, without a 
regulatory scheme for information privacy, that state is denied access to 
an extremely valuable resource in fighting cross-border crime. To guar-
antee privacy compliance by national police, each state is required to 
establish an independent national supervisory body with adequate over-
sight powers.53 Similarly, the network center—the central office in The 
Hague—is bound by the privacy principles of the Council of Europe Con-
vention on Personal Data Processing.54 Compliance at the center is 
likewise guaranteed by a special-purpose independent supervisory body 
established under the Europol Convention and known as the Joint Super-
visory Body.55  
The network nodes and the network center are also held to a number 
of specific data protection guarantees articulated in the Europol Conven-
tion. As explained earlier, Europol is responsible for three different sets 
of information: the EIS, work files created to assist with specific national 
investigations, and an index system designed to make the information in 
the work files readily available. Under the Europol Convention, such 
information may only be used to combat specifically listed crimes.56 The 
                                                                                                                      
 52. Europol Convention, supra note 5, art. 14. 
 53. Id. art. 23. 
 54. Id. art. 14.3. 
 55. Id. art. 24. 
 56. Id. art. 8. 
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party that inputs personal data into one of the systems must also ensure 
that the data is accurate and up-to-date.57  
Information in the different systems may be retained only as long as 
necessary to accomplish the crime-fighting purposes for which it was 
originally entered into the system. In fact, the Convention goes further: it 
establishes a specific three-year baseline for retention of personal data. 
Every three years, the national authorities responsible for entering in-
formation into the EIS must review that information to guarantee that it 
is still serving the original investigative purpose. If a national authority 
fails to make a decision in favor of retention, the information is auto-
matically deleted from the EIS. By contrast, the information contained in 
work files and cross-referenced in the index system must be deleted after 
three years. That three-year period, however, may be renewed if the Di-
rector of Europol finds the information “strictly necessary” for the 
criminal investigation that originally led to the creation of the work file.58 
Indeed, when a work file is initially created, the Joint Supervisory Au-
thority has the power to review the file to ensure that the planned 
collection and analysis of personal information accords with privacy 
principles.59  
Individuals have a right to check on their information to learn 
whether they are covered by any of Europol’s three systems. If such in-
formation exists, individuals have the right to have any inaccurate 
information corrected or, if it was collected and processed in contraven-
tion of data protection principles other than accuracy, to have it deleted. 
Individuals must file such requests with their national data protection 
body, which then forwards the requests to Europol. After checking the 
information, Europol replies directly to the individual, who can appeal to 
the Joint Supervisory Body if she is not satisfied with the reply.60 The 
Europol Convention contains yet another privacy guarantee: to facilitate 
oversight by the Joint Supervisory Body, retrievals of personal informa-
tion by the central office from the three systems must be recorded. In the 
case of the EIS, each retrieval must be documented; in the case of the 
other two systems, one out of every ten retrievals, at a minimum, must 
                                                                                                                      
 57. Id. art. 15. 
 58. Id. art. 21, amended by Council Act of 27 November 2003 drawing up, on the Basis 
of Article 43(1) of the Convention on the Establishment of a European Police Office (Europol 
Convention), a Protocol Amending that Convention, 2004 O.J. (C 2) 1.  
 59. Id. art. 12. 
 60. Id. arts. 19–20. See, e.g., Europol Joint Supervisory Body, The Second Activ-
ity Report of the Europol Joint Supervisory Body 21–26 (2005), available at http:// 
europoljsb.consilium.europa.eu/documents/45EA1FE4-5DAA-41ED-9356-
FA169E5B0800.pdf; Europol Joint Supervisory Body, Europol Activity Report 38–42 
(2003), available at http://europoljsb.consilium.europa.eu/documents/12FE0898-A493-4E30-
A2D7-D606D2D3C280.pdf. 
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be documented.61 Lastly, national authorities and the central office are 
required to implement technical measures to protect Europol’s informa-
tion systems against unauthorized use and to enable recordkeeping.62 
These specific provisions should be familiar from the earlier discus-
sion of national information privacy law. The limitation on the purposes 
for which personal information may be used, the requirement of accu-
racy, the specification of a time period for data retention, and the need 
for security measures all have their equivalents in national law. Likewise, 
the different oversight mechanisms—the right to check on personal in-
formation held by Europol and independent supervisory bodies—have 
national counterparts.  
A second type of data protection guarantee was created in the Euro-
pol Convention, applicable not to the immediate circle of network 
participants but to an outer circle of nonsignatory states. Under the Eu-
ropol Convention, personal information may be transferred to third 
countries to assist with specific investigations involving terrorism, drug 
trafficking, counterfeiting, and any of the other crimes covered by the 
Convention. Third countries, however, must ensure an adequate level of 
data protection before personal information may be transferred.63 Ade-
quacy does not signify an identical set of privacy rights, but it does entail 
legislation that broadly tracks the guarantees of the Council of Europe 
Convention on Personal Data Processing and that is subject to enforce-
ment by an independent government body. Only in “exceptional cases,” 
in which the Director of Europol considers the transfer of personal in-
formation “absolutely necessary to safeguard the essential interests of 
the Member States,” or “in the interests of preventing imminent danger 
associated with crime,” can the requirement of adequacy be waived.64 On 
the receiving end, when information is received from third countries, it 
must be checked independently by Europol’s central office for reliability 
and lawfulness.65  
Europol’s laws and practices illustrate two fundamentally different 
sets of privacy guarantees available to intelligence networks. First, all 
participants can be required to adhere to the same multilateral privacy 
standards. Those standards might be written into the agreement on intel-
ligence exchange or contained in an international instrument distinct 
                                                                                                                      
 61. Europol Convention, supra note 5, art. 16.  
 62. Id. art. 25. 
 63. Id. art. 18.  
 64. Id., amended by Council Act of 27 November 2003 Drawing Up, on the Basis of 
Article 43(1) of the Convention on the Establishment of a European Police Office (Europol 
Convention), a Protocol Amending that Convention, 2004 O.J. (C 2) 1. 
 65. Id. art. 15; Council Act of 3 November 1998 Laying Down Rules Concerning the 
Receipt of Information by Europol from Third Parties, 1999 O.J. (C 26) 17. 
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from the agreement. The Europol Convention makes use of both possi-
bilities: the parties must implement the general guarantees of the Council 
of Europe Convention on Personal Data Processing as well as the spe-
cific provisions of the Europol Convention. Once all the parties adhere to 
these same privacy standards, information can be exchanged freely. In 
fact, under the Europol Convention and similar agreements, the parties 
are under a duty to share information that can assist the other parties in 
preventing crime and threats to national security. In addition, the net-
work center—Europol’s central office—is subject to nearly identical 
privacy duties.  
Second, each network participant can unilaterally adopt privacy 
norms and unilaterally enforce those norms against sub-standard net-
work participants. Before one network party transfers information to 
another network party, it may require that privacy assurances be given by 
the receiving party. Likewise, when one network party receives informa-
tion from another network party, it may independently guarantee the 
reliability and lawfulness of that information. This is the mechanism cre-
ated in the Europol Convention for relations with third countries, the 
outer-circle of the information-exchange network. Indeed, this form of 
unilateral enforcement of privacy standards by domestic intelligence 
agencies was recommended by the Canadian Commission of Inquiry to 
avert another case such as Arar’s.66  
The disadvantages of this second type of privacy guarantee are obvi-
ous: each privacy-abiding party to an intelligence network is required to 
review routinely the privacy arrangements of the other parties to the 
network with whom information is shared. Such privacy checks can stall 
the free exchange of information on serious crime and terrorism, the 
very raison d’être of such networks. A multilateral instrument, therefore, 
would appear to be a preferable mechanism for guaranteeing privacy in 
the work of intelligence networks.  
VII. Conclusion 
 Liberal societies that permit their governments to conduct free–
ranging surveillance risk sinking rapidly into illiberalism. That much is 
part of the philosophical and legal canon of liberal democracy. The dan-
ger of surveillance through the collection and combination of electronic 
data is also widely perceived—albeit somewhat more dimly—than that 
                                                                                                                      
 66. See Arar Commission: Analysis and Recommendations, supra note 29, at 101–
27, 343–44 (recommending that Canadian information privacy guarantees be imposed on 
information transferred to U.S. intelligence agencies); id. at 344 (recommending that caution 
be used in information transfers to or from countries with questionable human rights records). 
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of surveillance through conventional means. But the consequences of 
globalization for government surveillance and liberal rights are poorly 
understood. How does the right to privacy fare in today’s borderless 
world of national security threats and networked spy agencies? 
The answer to this question requires a careful assessment of both the 
values underpinning the right to privacy and the nature of transnational 
intelligence networks. Through privacy, liberal societies advance a num-
ber of goals: avoiding wrongful government determinations based on 
unreliable information, preventing the use of personal information for 
purposes of suppressing basic rights, and, most fundamentally, promot-
ing individual autonomy. Whenever government agencies collect, 
combine, and utilize personal information, these privacy interest are put 
at risk. But the sharing of intelligence transnationally raises special con-
cerns. Foremost among these is the danger that one or more of the state 
parties to the intelligence network will fail to respect privacy and other 
basic liberties. If only one of the many different national agencies that 
exchange personal information breaches privacy, the rights of citizens 
everywhere are compromised. 
One place to look for a constructive response to the liberal flaw of 
transnational networks is Europe. For a number of years, police and in-
telligence agencies have exchanged information as members of Europe-
wide networks. In these networks, two types of privacy safeguards have 
been adopted: multilateral standards, to which all the network parties 
must adhere, and unilateral standards, applicable under the law of only 
one of the parties and enforced against all the other parties by erecting 
barriers to information exchange with sub-standard parties. Because 
multilateral standards both promote government cooperation and ad-
vance liberal rights, they appear to hold the greatest promise for 
networks that extend beyond Europe.  
Of course, it might not be possible to agree on common privacy 
standards or, even assuming agreement, guarantee effective implementa-
tion of such standards at the national level. It is well known that the 
United States and the European Union differ on a number of important 
points of privacy law, with the European Union favoring stricter limita-
tions on government use of personal information. Furthermore, even 
though states might sign up to information privacy standards, they might 
not implement or enforce them, a problem common to many interna-
tional human rights regimes.  
Notwithstanding these obstacles, given the critical public mission of 
transnational intelligence networks, it seems well worth the effort to at-
tempt to reach consensus on privacy norms. After all, it is hard to 
disagree with the fundamental purposes of information privacy. Who 
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objects to preventing wrongful determinations based on unreliable in-
formation, protecting liberal rights from officious government meddling, 
and defending individual autonomy from Orwellian government surveil-
lance? It does not seem far-fetched to think that, in the future, agreement 
might be reached on the law necessary to promote such liberal aims in 
the networked world of government intelligence gathering. 
